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VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION OF HOLDERS OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN ACTIONS INVOLVING TITLES IN KENTUCKY
The rule that ordinarily an adjudication has no binding effect
on persons not parties or privies to the judgment is of such general
acceptance that it is usually considered axiomatic.' It is equally
well established that even though a particular party is not before
the court, if he is so far represented by others that his interests
will receive full and complete consideration, a binding decree may,
in certain situations, be rendered for or against him even though
he is not actually joined as a party. It is the function of this note
to examine the application of this doctrine of virtual representation in Kentucky with respect to the rights of holders of future
interests.'
1.

Life Estate, Vested Remainder in a Class.

A vested remainder subject to being partly divested by the
admission of additional remaindermen presents one of the most
common situations for the application of the doctrine of virtual
representation. Where property is conveyed or devised to A for
life with remainder to A's children, as soon as a child is born the
remainder bceomes vested subject to partial divestment to let in
'1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) sec. 407" RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS (1942) sec. 93.
One phase of this rule of representation has been incorporated
into the KENTUCKY CIVL CODE OF PRACTICE which states that, "If
the question involve a common or general interest of many persons,
or if the parties be numerous and it is impracticable to bring all of
them before the court within a reasonable time, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all." Ky. CiV. CODE PRAC. (Carroll,
1938) sec. 25. Under the new rules of federal procedure when the
question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole. Rule 23, FED. RULES CIV. PROc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1941) foll. see.
723c. Similar statutory provisions are found in most of the states.
For instance, the California statute provides that, "
when the
question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons,
or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all." CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1941) sec. 382.
See generally, Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests (1936) 30 ILL. L. REV. 580.
"The doctrine of representation applies to both legal and
equitable actions. However, due to the nature of the interests usually
involved, future interests and title in unborn or unascertamed persons, the judicial proceedings in which the question arises are
usually of equitable origin. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) sec.
180, comment b.
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4
possible after-born children. So long as A continues to live there
exists the possibility of additional remaindermen. If it were necessary that all these contingent remamdermen be made parties to an
action involving title to the property the litigation would have
to be postponed until they were all ascertained, vwz., until the
death of A. The courts have met the situation by holding that all
the contingent remaindermen are virtually represented by the
living children. Since the unborn remaindermen will take, if at all,
merely as members of a class, some members of which are before
the court, it is entirely reasonable to suppose that their interests
will be properly presented and they will not be prejudiced by a
decree rendered before their birth. Furthermore, if the delay should
be required, a holder of a lien or other adverse claim against the
estate might be forced to wait until all possibility of issue became
5
extinct before asserting his interest
8
In Brown v. FerreU land was held by a life tenant with remainder to his heirs. The life tenant had one child. An action was brought
to enforce a lien against the land, and the life tenant and the child
were made defendants. The land was ordered sold and it was held
that the decree of sale was sufficient to divest the unborn contin7
gent remaindermen of their interest. In Wayne v. Brumley a father
of two living children held a life estate with remainder to his children. The life tenant brought an action against the two living re-

'1

SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936)

PROPERTY

(3d ed. 1939) sec. 340;

sec. 61, 2 TIFFANY, REAL

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

(1936)

sec. 157.
Some states have solved the problem in a different way by
making provision that in certain situations, particularly proceedings
to compromise the effect of a will, unborn contingent remamdermen
may be represented by a guardian ad litem.
"If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the interests
of persons unknown or the future contingent interests of persons not
in being are or may be affected by the compromise, the court must
appoint some suitable person or persons to represent such interests
" 1 LAWS or N. Y. (Thompson, 1939) c. 18, sec. 19 (d).
"
if there shall be any future contingent estate or interest
which might be taken by any person not then in being, which may
be limited or diminished as aforesaid, the court to which such agreement shall have been so submitted shall appoint a guardian ad item
" CoviP.
to represent such person, contingent estate or interests.
LAws MICH. (1929) sec. 15582"If the court finds that any future contingent interest which
would arise under said will if admitted to probate would be affected
by the arbitration or compromise, it, shall appoint some person to
represent such interests in such controversy, and the court shall
have like power as to any bequests made in the will for charitable
purposes, if no trustees have been appointed in such will; in both
cases with such conditions as to costs as the court orders." GEN.
LAws MAss. (1932) c. 204, sec. 16.
83 Ky. 417 (1885).
190 Ky. 488, 227 S.W 996 (1921).
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maindermen for the sale of the land. A decree of sale was granted.
After the sale the.life tenant became the father of another child,
and. this third child, on the theory that he was not bound by the
prior decree, claimed his share in the property and brought an
action against the purchaser to quiet his title. It was held that the
after-born child had been virtually represented by the two living
children who were before the court, and that the sale made under
the decree rendered had divested him of his interest. The same rule
that unborn contingent remaindermen may be represented by the
living members of their class in actions for the sale of land, applies
in actions brought by the holder of an estate pur autre vie" and in
actions brought by one living remainderman against a life tenant
and other remaindermen' The rule of representation also applies to
actions brought to construe a will,'" and in Kendall v. Crawford'1
it was recognized in an action to reform a deed. In the latter case it
was held that the grantee of a deed, conveying a life estate to the
grantee with remainder to the grantee's heirs, could successfully
maintain an action against an adopted child, as sole heir apparent,
to have the deed reformed to give a fee simple to the grantee. The
case is significant in that it recognizes the right of an adopted child
to represent possible natural children, and that it applies the doctrine of virtual representation to an action brought by the holder of
the particular estate to divest the contingent remaindermen of their
interest.
In each of the cases mentioned above the contingent remaindermen were members of a specifically designated class. In each case
some members of the class were in being and in each case all those
in being were made parties to the action. The contingency consisted
merely in the possibility that the class would later be opened to let
in new members. In such a situation the interests of those before
the court exactly coincide with the interests of the unborn remaindermen and this identity of interest, together with the necessity for
a present adjudication of the dispute, provides a clear ground for
applying the doctrine of virtual representation.-'
'Tierney Coal Co. v Bailey, 172 Ky 362, 189 S.W 241 (1916).
In this case the court seemed to rely heavily upon Ky. CIv. CODE
PRAC. (Carroll, 1938) sec. 491a-1, which states that, "Remainder and
contingent interests in real estate may be sold upon petition of any
person having a present or vested interest, all persons in being
having any interest in such estate being made parties to the action
'Harris v. Anderson, 3 Ky. LAW REP. 237 (1881).
'"Masonic Widows' & Orphans' Home & Infirmary v Hieatt
Bros., 197 Ky 301, 247 S.W 34 (1923)
" 25 Ky Law Rep. 1224, 77 S.W 364 (1903).
1 These two elements, the necessities of the case and the assumption that identity of interest will result in adequate protection
of the parties represented, seem to be the basis of the doctrine.
1 FREEMAN, OP. cit. supra note 1, sec. 489. Some cases have sug-

STUDENT NOTES AND COMM-rENTS

2.

Life Estate, Contingent Remainder in a Class, None of Whom
Are in Being.

Where no members of the class entitled to take are in being a
more difficult question is raised. The view that unborn contingent
remaindermen could never be bound by a judgment rendered before any of their class were in being found support in the early
cases of some of the states, particularly in North Carolina." The
situation has since been changed in that state by a statutory provision for the appointment of a guardian ad litem," and it is doubtful if any state at the present time would go so far as to hold that
unborn contingent remaindermen cannot be represented under any
circumstances unless some members of their class are in being.
Kentucky has apparently solved the problem without the necessity
for a guardian ad litem and without the aid of a statute. It seems
to be sufficient in Kentucky that there be in existence and before
the court such parties as will insure an adequate protection of the
interests of the unborn remaindermen. If there is such an identity
gested that motives of affection resulting from the close relationship
(often parent and child) of the parties is a factor but it is doubtful
if such relationship has much weight in the decisions. See 1 FREEMAN, op. cit, supra note 1, sec. 490. The Kentucky court has stated
the doctrine is planted squarely on the ground of identity
that, "
of interest between the parties to the action and the persons they
are held to represent." Lowe v. Taylor, 222 Ky. 846, 850, 2 S.W 2d
1042, 1044 (1928).
See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) sec. 183.
aThe view taken in North Carolina is well illustrated by Watson v. Watson, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 400 (1857) In that case land
was devised to A for life, remainder to such of his children as might
be living at his death or to the living issue of such of his children
as might have died. In default of issue the remainder was to go to
certain third persons. Before A had any children he brought an
action against the named third persons for a decree of sale and reinvestment. It was held that these alternative contingent remaindermen were incapable of representing the unborn children of A and
that no decree could be rendered concerning the sale of the land
until some such children were ?n esse.
" "In all cases where there is a vested interest in real estate,
and a contingent remainder over to persons who are not in being, or
when the contingency has not yet happened which will determine
who the remaindermen are, there may be a sale, lease or mortgage
of the property by a proceeding in the superior court, which proceeding shall be conducted in the manner pointed out in this section.
In cases where the remainder will or may go to minors, or persons
under other disabilities, or to persons not in being, or whose names
and residences are not known or who may in any contingency become interested in said land, but because of such contingency cannot be ascertained, the clerk of the superior court shall, after due
inquiry of persons who are in no way interested in or connected
with such proceeding, designate and appoint some discreet person
" 2 GEN.
as guardian ad litem, to represent such remaindermen.
STAT. N.C. (1943) sec. 41-11.
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of interests as will result in adequate protection of their rights, an
adjudication may be had which will be binding upon an entire
class even though no member of the class is in being when the
suit is brought or judgment is rendered.
In McClure v. Crume'5 an estate was held by a life tenant with
remainder to his issue, and, in default of issue, remainder over to
certain third persons. The life tenant, while without issue, brought
an action under section 491 of the Kentucky Civil Code of Practice
for the sale and reinvestment of the proceeds. The third persons,
the secondary remaindermen, were made parties. In that case there
8
was a decree for sale and reinvestment,"
and it was held that the
issue of the life tenant were virtually represented by the secondary
remaindermen. The decision appears sound since the court had before it the persons in whom the estate would have vested if the contingency had happened prior to the bringing of the action. Such
persons had the same interest in the preservation of the estate as
the issue of the life tenant would have had and could be relied upon
to properly represent their interests in the litigation.
3.

Defeasible Fees.

Another situation where unborn contingent remaindermen may
be represented, although no members of their class are m being,
arises in the case of defeasible fees. Where the holder of a defeasible
fee is a party to an action for the sale of property he is deemed to
be the virtual representative of the unborn contingent remaindermen
who will take in the event of defeasance. Thus in Middleton v.
Graves" property was left to A for life with remainder to B and C
equally or to the survivor of them if either should die without issue.
Both B and C had a defeasible fee subject to defeasance in the event
of their death without issue. B and C each were executory devisees
of the interest of the other and if either of them should die leaving
issue the issue would become entitled to the decedent's share. While
B and C were both living but without children the life tenant
brought an action against them for a decree of sale of the property.
The decree was granted and was binding on the afterborn children
of B and C, such children being virtually represented by their parents who were before the court and who had interests identical
with theirs.
11141 Ky. 361, 132 S.W 433 (1910).
6An interesting feature of the case, though not dealt with in
this note, was the fact that the reinvestment granted here was m
real estate located outside the commonwealth. The decision of the
court on the virtual representation point was unanimous but Judge
Nunn dissented in the holding that the court had authority to order
reinvestment in lands outside Kentucky. McClure v. Crume, 141 Ky.
361, 366, 132 S.W 433, 434-435 (1910).
11229 Ky. 640, 17 S.W 2d 741 (1929).
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4.

Representation by a Trustee.

A recent case, Smith v Fowler,' held that in the absence of
Iraud or collusion a trustee could represent unborn contingent remaindermen of a class, none of whom were -m esse, where the trustee
and the first takers were both before the court. In that case a testator left his estate to a trustee with income to his widow for life or
widowhood, then to his children for life, then to the lineal descendants of such children for their lives, and after the death of the
widow, the children, their spouses, and all lineal descendants of the
children, the income was to be paid to a named charity. Before any
of the children had issue the trustee of the estate brought an action
for the construction of the will and named as defendants the testator's widow, his children and their spouses, and the trustees of the
named charity. It was decided that the limitations in the will constituted a violation of the rule against perpetuities and that after
the death or re-marriage of the widow the children took possession
in fee simple. In a subsequent action for specific performance of
contract for the sale of the land it was contended that the unborn
lineal descendants were not bound by the decree and could not be
divested of their interest. Obviously these unborn contingent remaindermen could not have been represented by the life tenants,
since the interest of the life tenants was in direct opposition to that
of the remaindermen. The court held, however, that the contingent
remainderrnen were properly represented by the trustee who had
the legal title to the property This is apparently the first time Kentucky has recognized the right of a trustee to represent contingent
remaindermen" although the doctrine seems to be of general acceptance where the problem has been raised,' and is, in many respects, analogous to the guardian ad litem situation.
' 301 Ky. 96, 190 S.W 2d 1015 (1945)
"Counsel for the appellees state that they have found no case
in this 3urisdiction directly in point, nor have we; but it seems to be
rather generally held that a trustee may represent unborn contingent
remaindermen where the first takers are before the court.
Smith v Fowler, 301 Ky 96, 98, 190 S.W 2d 1015, 1017 (1945)
1 "The doctrine of virtual representation is thoroughly established in Tennessee. It is well settled that contingent limitations and
executory devises to persons not in being, or uncertain and indeterminable at the time of the proceedings, may be bound by a decree
against the person then clanming the vested estate. In suits to enforce
a trust, or with reference to trust property, so limited in remainder,
if the holder of the legal title, the life tenant, and the persons in
being in whom the remainder would become a vested estate if the
life estate then fell in-if all these are parties, a valid decree may be
pronounced." Bransford Realty Co. v Andrews, 128 Tenn. 725, 164
S.W 1175, 1178 (1914).
"As we have already indicated, the equitable doctrine of representation permits foreclosure of the interests of unborn contingent
remaindermen where their rights are represented by parties properly
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In reaching its conclusion in Smith V. Fowler, the court relied
heavily on the necessity for a present adjudication and on its belief
that no present adjudication could be had unless the trustee could
represent the interests of the unborn contingent remaindermen.1
It completely omitted any discussion of the possibility of such interests being represented by the trustees of the named charity. While
representation by the trustee of the estate is apparently sound, it is
believed that by failing to discuss the other possibility the court
overlooked an important point in the case. Had the will been sustained, and had the alleged life estate of the children of the testator
fallen in at the time of the bringing of the action, while there were
no lineal descendants of the life tenants in being, the estate would
have gone to the charity The charity then had in the estate an
interest identical with that of such unborn lineal descendants and
it is difficult to see why the trustees of the charity would not have
been proper virtual representatives of these remaindermen.
5.

Representation of Living Remamdermen.

Where living members of the class are available but are not
made parties it has often been held in Kentucky that the contingent remaindermen are properly represented by persons holding
vested interests in the property and having in the litigation an
interest identical with that of the contingent remaindermen. It is
probably on this point that the Kentucky doctrine on virtual representation makes the greatest deviation from the general view held
by the American courts.' A situation in which the problem nght
arise can best be illustrated by an example. A testator devised an
estate to a trustee to pay the income for life to the testator's
children with remainder to such of their children as should be
living at the death of the life tenants. The trustee disclaimed and
The essentials of due process are fully satisfied
before the court.
by the provision in the statute which authorizes a court to appoint
some competent and disinterested person as trustee of the interests
of those not in being." Gunnell v Palmer, 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E. 2d
202, 205 (1938).
Although beyond the scope of this note, an inquiry might well be
made into the question whether such cases are properly considered
under the doctrine of virtual representation or as merely a phase of
the normal powers of a trustee. Whatever the proper rationalization
might be, it seems to be rather generally accepted that a trustee may
represent a class of contingent remaindermen, all of whom are as
yet unborn.
21 C,
if the trustee had not been permitted to represent their
interests, it would not have been possible to have had a construction
of the will until after the death of Mr. Fowler's children." Smith v
Fowler, 301 Ky 96, 99, 190 S.W 2d 1015, 1017 (1945).
-The general view held by American courts is that if remaindermen are available they must be made parties to actions involving
titles. Note (1939) 120 A.L.R. 877-878.
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the administrator with will annexed brought an action for the
appointment of a new trustee. The children of the-testator were
named defendants but the living grandchildren were. not made
parties. The contingent interests of the grandchildren were virtually represented by the life tenants and the grandchildren were
not necessary parties to the action.' No indication was given in the
opinion as to why the living grandchildren were not made parties,
the court apparently considering that a matter without significance.
If the life tenant is made a party to an action to enforce a
lien against the property it is not necessary to join the contingent
remainderman even though he is in being.' This is a rather broad
application of the doctrine of virtual representation but it is justifiable on the theory that the life tenant has the same interest in
protecting the estate that the remainderman would have.
The Kentucky court has often held that only the persons
holding the first vested estate of inheritance need be joined in
an action involving title to the property.' Thus in Hermann.v. Parsons" a testator left property to his wife for life. At the death of the
wife the property was to be divided equally among the testator's
children. The issue of any deceased child was to stand in the posi-WhaUen v. Kellner, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1285, 104 S.W 1018
(1907). In referring to this case in a subsequent opinion the court
said, "It is true that the foregoing case is'not in accord with the
weight of authority, but we are not disposed to overrule it.
Newkirk v. Ingels, 197 Ky. 473, 476, 248 S.W 488, 489 (1923).
In an earlier case, Clay's Adm'r. v Edwards' Trustee, 84 Ky.
548 (1886), the court had taken a position apparently opposed to
the rule of Whallen v. Kellner. In the Whallen case the court distinguished the earlier case on the ground that there they were dealing with a vested, not a contingent remainder. However, it is submitted that this distinction is erroneous and that the remainders
were contingent in both cases.
- Newkirk v. Ingels, 197 Ky 473, 248 S.W 488 (1923) Davie's
Executor v City of Louisville, 171 Ky. 663, 188 S.W 911 (1916),
Jailea'te v Bell, 33 Ky Law Rep. 159, 110 S.W 298 (1908)
5 If the action is one for sale and reinvestment it is apparently
covered by the code provision that, "In an equitable action by the
owner of a particular estate of freehold in possession, or by a
guardian or committee as provided in Section 489, against the owner
of the reversion or remainder, though, he be an infant or of unsound mind, and against the owner of the particular estate if he be
an infant or of unsound mind; or, if the remainder be contingent,
against the person, if in being, in whom it would have vested if the
contingency had happened before commencement of the action,
though he be an infant or of unsound mind, and against the owner
of the particular estate if he be an infant or of unsound mind-real
property may be sold for reinvestment of the proceeds in other real
property." KY. CIV. CODE PRAC. (Carroll, 1938) sec. 491 (Supp. 1947).
The rule, however, has been applied in other situations. Hermann v.
Parsons, 117 Ky. 239, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1344, 78 S.W 125 (1904)
(action
enforce a lien).
-.117to Ky.
239, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1344, 78 S.W 125 (1904)
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tion of its parent. In an action to enforce a lien against the property
the widow and the children were made parties but the grandchildren
were not. It was held that the widow had a life interest and the
children a fee subject to its being defeated by their death preceding
that of the widow. The grandchildren were mere contingent remaindermen. The interest of the widow plus that of the children
made up the first estate of inheritance and they were, therefore,
the only parties necessary to the action.'
Under the first-estate-of-inheritance rule it seems clear that
where there is a limitation to one class of contingent remaindermen,
and, in default of that class, provision is made for an alternative
class, the members of the alternative class, although in being, are
not necessary parties to an action involving title to the property7In Goff v. Renmck' there was a devise to a donee for life with remainder to the children of the donee. If the donee should die without
issue the remainder was to go to his brothers, and if they should
predecease the donee, then to their descendants. An action was
brought under section 491 of the Kentucky Civil Code of Practice
for sale and reinvestment. It was held that the living descendants
of the life tenant's brothers were not necessary parties to the
action.' In such a case it is sufficient that the persons in whom the
estate will vest if the contingency happens at the time of the bringing of the action, the devisees apparent, are made parties' The
'The first-estate-of-inheritance doctrine has been criticised as
not applicable to this type of situation and not necessary to explain
the cases purporting to follow it. Such critics point out that it is
properly referred to only in connection with the English estate tail.
3 SiMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) sec. 672. However, it is often
referred to in the Kentucky cases and is apparently used as a basis
for many of the decisions. Goff v Renick, 156 Ky. 588, 161 S.W 983
(1913) Hermann v Parsons, 117 Ky. 239, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1344, 78
S.W 125 (1904)
'Willis v. Lapsley, 240 Ky 829, 43 S.W 2d 47 (1931), Goff v.
Renick, 156 Ky. 588, 161 S.W 983 (1913).
- 156 Ky 588, 161 S.W 983 (1913)
'It might be noted that in this case there were three classes of
contingent remaindermen, the life tenant's children, his brothers,
and the brothers' descendants. Both the first and second were made
parties but the third was not. The same rule that made it unnecessary to make the living members of the third class parties would
seem to remove the necessity for the second also, and the court so
indicated, stating in its opinion that, "If our construction of section
491, of the Civil Code, correctly interprets its meaning, the
brothers of the life tenant
were not necessary parties to the
action, though doubtless made so as a matter of precaution on the
part of the life tenant and to show their approval of the sale of
the land." Goff v. Renick, 156 Ky 588, 593, 161 S.W 983, 985 (1913).
="
although the remainder may be contingent, yet if the
person in being in whom the remainder interest would have vested,
if the contingency had happened before the commencement of the
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fact that there are at the time other living persons who have an
alternative contingent interest m the property does not affect the
validity of the decree. In a similar case under the same code provision the court later stated that the alternative contingent remaindermen "were neither necessary nor proper parties."' This is
apparently a very unusual position for a court to take. In effect,
it is that persons who admittedly have an interest in property are
not proper parties to an action involving title to that property
A number of Kentucky cases can be found holding that the
alternative remamdermen are not necessary parties. In one case
property was devised to A for life with remainder to A's children
and, in default of issue, to named third persons or to the issue of
any of the named third persons who might be dead. The issue cf
the third persons were not necessary parties to an action by the
life tenant for a decree of sale and reinvestment." In another case
land was conveyed to A for life with remainder to A's children and
in default of issue remainder to the heirs of the grantor. The heirs
of the grantor were not necessary parties to an action for the sale
of the land.'
As indicated above, these cases, holding that living contingent
remaindermen may be virtually represented in actions involving
title to property, are peculiar to Kentucky and possibly a few other
states,"' the general rule being that if remaindermen are available
they must be made parties. It is believed, however, that the Kentucky rule is sound in theory and that there is little possibility
that injustice will result from its application. The interests of the
contingent remaindermen are clearly protected since it is required
that parties be before the court whose interests are the same as
theirs. Such persons will have the same motive for protecting the
estate that the remaindermen themselves would have. The Kentucky rule also has the added advantage of making it unnecessary
to bring before the court persons who are only remotely interested
and who are unlikely ever to have a vested interest in the estate.
This advantage is particularly noticeable when the alternative contingent remaindermen are very numerous or difficult of ascertainment.
action, be properly before the court
a complete and perfect
title may be passed.
" Luttrell v. Wells, 97 Ky. 84, 90, 16 Ky.
Law Rep. 812, 814-815, 30 S.W 10, 11 (1895).
' Willis v. Lapsley 240 Ky 829, 835, 43 S.W 2d 47, 50 (1931).
32
Walsh v. Pkrr's Executor & Trustee, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 242,
110 S.W 300 (1908).
Fritsch v. Klausing, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 788, 13 S.W 241 (1890>
(Emphasis placed on the remoteness of the interest clained by the
alternative remaindermen).
'See Edwards v. Harrison, 236 S.W 328 (Mo., 1921).
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6.

Conflicting ]nteresets.

Where there is a conflict of interest between the representative and the party purporting to be represented there appears to be
no basis for the application of the doctrine. In one case a deed
purported to convey a life estate to the grantee with remainder to
his bodily heirs. Before any such heirs were in existence the grantee brought action against the grantor to have the deed reformed so
as to give him a fee instead of a life estate, alleging that the limitation to a life estate was put into the deed by mistake. Since the
interest of the life tenant was clearly in conflict with that of the
remaindermen, the former could not be the virtual representative
of the latter and no decree could be had which would bind the
unborn heirs.' Had the action been one to enforce a lien against
the property or to establish some other claim adverse to the interest of the life tenant as well as that of the remaindermen, no
doubt the life tenant would have been a proper representative of
the unborn bodily heirs." A different result could possibly have
been reached under the facts presented if a guardian ad litem had
been appointed to represent the unborn heirs.
7.

Suits Between Parties Privy to The Estate.

A judgment obtained by a party privy to the instrument creating the remainder has been distinguished from a judgment obtained by a stranger although the extent of the distinction is none
too clear. In Johnson v. Jacob' an estate was devised to a trustee,
the income to go to a named beneficiary for life, remainder to his
descendants and if no descendants, to his heirs. The life tenant
erected valuable buildings on the land and then petitioned the
court for permission to withdraw property from -the trust in an
amount sufficient to compensate him for the buildings. All living
presumptive heirs were made defendants, and the life tenant was
permitted to withdraw the property On the death of the life tenant, an heir born after the original judgment had been entered
claimed her interest in the property as against the life tenant's
devisee. It was held that the after-born heir had not been virtually
represented by the living presumptive heirs in the prior action and
was not bound by the decree rendered. Some of the language in
the court's- opinion would seem to indicate that a contingent
remainderman can never be virtually represented in an action
"Lowe v. Taylor, 222 Ky 846, 2 S.W 2d 1042 (1928).
'The court stated in its opinion that, "If such suit is brought
by or against a stranger to the estate, it is generally held sufficient to bring before the court all persons in being who have vested
estates, and whose interest in the subject of the litigation is identical with after-born and contingent remaindermen.
Lowe v.
Taylor, 222 Ky. 846, 848-849, 2 S.W 2d 1042, 1043 (1928).
" 74 Ky.(11 Bush) 646 (1876).
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brought by one in privity with the estate.' Such a meaning, however, was apparently not intended by the court and is not in harmony with other decisions. Numerous cases can be found holding
that the doctrine of virtual representation applies to suits between
parties privy to the estate for a decree of sale and reinvestment.'4
The doctrine also applies to actions for the construction of a will"
and for reformation of a deed even though the person bringing the
action is in privity with the estate.
The real basis for the distinction made in Johnson v. Jacob appears to be, not merely that the person bringing the action was
privy to the title, but that he was a privy who had deliberately
created a claim against the estate and then brought an action in the
hope of profiting at the expense of the contingent remaindermen.
It was probably this deliberate creation of a claim that was of
greatest influence in the decision of the court." Even so, it is difficult to find any important difference between an action by a life
tenant to withdraw part of the property from the operation of a
trust and an action by a life tenant to reform a deed so as to give
him a fee simple. It was held in Kendall v. Crawford" that in the
latter type of case the living contingent remaindermen could represent the unborn persons of the same class in an action brought by
the life tenant, no suggestion being made as to any necessity for a
guardian ad litem. In view of the other decisions referred to, it is
doubtful if the case of Johnson v. Jacob will be extended beyond
its particular facts and that the restriction will not be applied except in cases where the party bringing the action is, not only in
privity with the estate, but also has actively participated in the creation of the claim which he seeks to assert against it.
* In referring to other cases cited by opposing counsel the
court said, "In each of these cases the complainant was a stranger
to the title under and through which the contingent remaindermen
claimed title." Johnson v Jacob, 74 Ky (11 Bush) 646, 660 (1876).
"Middleton v. Graves, 229 Ky 640, 17 S.W 2d 741 (1929)Goff v Renick, 156 Ky 588, 161 S.W 983 (1913) McClure v. Crume,
141 Ky 361, 132 S.W 433 (1910)
Walsh v. Parr's Executor &
Trustee, 33 Ky Law Rep. 242, 110 S.W 300 (1908); Fritsch v.
Klausing, 11 Ky Law Rep. 788, 13 S.W 241 (1890).
"Masonic Widows' & Orphans' Home & Infirmary v. Hieatt
Bros., 197 Ky. 301, 247 S.W 34 (1923).
-Kendall v Crawford, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1224, 77 S.W 364
(1903).
"The court pointed out that, "Here the life-tenant, holding
under the title through which these appellants claim, and with full
knowledge of all the facts, voluntarily created or attempted to
create in his own behalf a claim against the estate of the remaindermen." Johnson v. Jacob, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 646, 659 (1876).
"25 Ky Law Rep. 1224, 77 S.W 364 (1903).
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Conclusion.

In conclusion it may be stated that the doctrine of virtual representation of holders of future interests has received a rather broad
and liberal interpretation by the Kentucky courts. Where all living members of a class are made parties to an action the possible
unborn members are not necessary parties. Even though no members of the class in question are in being they may be virtually
represented by others whose interests are identical with theirs. It
is ordinarily held sufficient that there be before the court the persons making up the first vested estate of inheritance. All contingent remaindermen coming after them are then bound by the
judgment. This doctrine has been applied to make it unnecessary
to bring before the court alternative contingent remaindermen who
are in being if the person in whom the estate would vest, if the
contingency happened at the time of the bringing of the action,
were made a party A distinction has been made between cases where
contingent remaindermen's rights are affected by a judgment obtained by one in privity with the estate and by a stranger to the
instrument creating the contingent remainder. It is doubtful, however, if this distinction is of any importance except in cases where
the suitor in privity with the estate, with full knowledge of the
remaindermen's rights, deliberately creates a claim against the
estate and then seeks to enforce it through a virtual representative.
The virtual representation doctrine is planted on the theory
of the identity of interests of parties before the court with those of
parties not before the court. It is this principle that is of most
aid in solving the cases. A contingent remainderman is never bound
by a judgment if his only representative in the action was a person
having an interest which was in conflict with his own. It is believed that if this requirement of identity of interest is kept in
mind and if all members of a given class are treated equally, there
should be little difficulty in dealing with problems as they arise.
BERTEL M. SPARKS

